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A growing trend of neuroimaging, behavioral, and computational research has investigated
the topic of outcome uncertainty in decision-making. Although evidence to date indicates
that humans are very effective in learning to adapt to uncertain situations, the nature of the
speciﬁc cognitive processes involved in the adaptation to uncertainty are still a matter of
debate. In this article, we reviewed evidence suggesting that cognitive control processes
are at the heart of uncertainty in decision-making contexts. Available evidence suggests
that: (1) There is a strong conceptual overlap between the constructs of uncertainty and
cognitive control; (2)There is a remarkable overlap between the neural networks associated
with uncertainty and the brain networks subserving cognitive control; (3) The perception
and estimation of uncertainty might play a key role in monitoring processes and the evalua-
tion of the “need for control”; (4) Potential interactions between uncertainty and cognitive
control might play a signiﬁcant role in several affective disorders.
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Decision-making during uncertainty is classically deﬁned as a
situation that has limited or incalculable information about the
predicted outcomes of behavior (Huettel et al., 2005). Uncer-
tainty is considered a key dimension of everyday behavior that
has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on decision-making (Yoshida and Ishii,
2006), and important links with emotion and psychopathologi-
cal disorders (Holaway et al., 2006; Boelen and Reijntjes, 2009).
Although uncertainty has long been a topic of scientiﬁc interest
(see Bertelson and Boons, 1960), it has become an object of intense
investigation in more recent years, inspiring a growing number of
behavioral, neuroimaging, and computational studies.
Most of the available experimental studies referring to the con-
cept of uncertaintyhave takenplacewithin the realmof researchon
decision-making processes. More speciﬁcally, these studies usually
employ tasks in which participants have to learn to predict future
outcomes on the basis of past outcomes that often take the form
of positive and/or negative reinforcements. Uncertainty in these
paradigms is usually manipulated by the variation of the predic-
tive power of past outcomes1. Much of this research has focused
on statistical models of learning such as Bayesian or Reinforce-
ment learning models (Daw et al., 2005; Kording and Wolpert,
2006; Yoshida and Ishii, 2006; Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007).
Most evidence to date suggests that humans are able to effectively
handle uncertainties in the environment to predict future events
and make appropriate decisions (Volz et al., 2003; Hsu et al., 2005;
Yu and Dayan, 2005; Kording andWolpert, 2006;Yoshida and Ishii,
2006; Behrens et al., 2007).
However, although these approaches have been generally suc-
cessful in providing formal algorithms ﬁtting human behavior in
1This form of uncertainty can be referred to as “outcome uncertainty,”which has to
be differentiated from the concept of “task uncertainty,” which refers to uncertainty
about the nature of the task to be performed in the next trial in multi-trial task-
switching paradigms (e.g., Rubin and Meiran, 2005). The present review focuses
essentially on outcome uncertainty.
uncertain conditions (Steyvers et al., 2003; Chater et al., 2006;
Yoshida and Ishii, 2006; Nassar et al., 2010), these models tend to
be largely agnostic regarding the speciﬁc cognitive mechanisms
recruited for this successful adaptation. In particular, with a few
exceptions (e.g., Daw et al., 2005), it is unclear if implicit learning
processes are sufﬁcient to adapt to uncertainty or if high level cog-
nitive control processes are also involved. Yet, the possibility that
cognitive control processes (or executive function) are involved
in overcoming uncertainty has often been proposed (e.g., Huettel
et al., 2005). In addition, uncertainty may also be to some extent
tacitly present in many cognitive control models and tasks (see
Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001). However, the ﬁeld
of research on uncertainty and the ﬁeld of research on cognitive
control processes have evolved mostly independently and attempts
to integrate them are rare. The goal of this article is to explic-
itly address the potential relationships between the constructs of
uncertainty and cognitive control. We will ﬁrst outline the con-
ceptual overlaps between uncertainty and cognitive control. Next,
we will review a large body of neuroimaging evidence suggesting
an overlap between brain areas involved in processing uncertainty
and the neural network subserving cognitive control. Then, we
will review evidence suggesting that uncertainty has a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on a key component of cognitive control – monitoring
processes. Finally, we will review a body of evidence suggesting
that the construct of “Intolerance of Uncertainty” (IOU) is linked
to affective disorders widely known to be associated with deﬁcits
in cognitive control.
THEORETICAL OVERLAPS BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY AND
COGNITIVE CONTROL
UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty is generally seen as a realization that our beliefs
and representations of the world are unable to accurately pre-
dict future events in our environment. In behavioral and cognitive
sciences, uncertainty has mainly been deﬁned within the scope
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of decision-making and therefore refers to a difﬁculty to pre-
dict events that are the consequences of our actions (Volz et al.,
2003; Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005).
Uncertainty can present itself under many forms. For instance, an
inﬂuential theory (Yu and Dayan, 2005) proposed that there are
two fundamental types of uncertainty: expected and unexpected
uncertainty. The former relates to environments in which avail-
able information is aweak predictor of future events.However, this
unreliability is stable and knownby agents in the environment. For
instance, driving in a city where most drivers consistently display
a poor compliance of trafﬁc rules is a typical example of expected
uncertainty: the rules are weak predictors of how drivers behave
(and of how they will react to our own behavior), and this unre-
liability is known and relatively stable. In contrast, unexpected
uncertainty refers to a situation in which fundamental changes in
the environment invalidate past predictions. For instance, pilots
of aeroplanes in cruise at high altitude experience this type of
uncertainty when they encounter turbulence that had not been
forecast.
Empirical literature on uncertainty has used experimental par-
adigms that can be subsumed under these two categories. A large
number of studies induced uncertainty by lowering the predictive
power of task cues (e.g., Bertelson and Boons, 1960; Scheffers and
Coles, 2000; Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004; Huettel et al., 2005).
Typically in these studies, participants are shown cues which are
probabilistic predictors of a given outcome (e.g., a square that pre-
dicts the occurrence of a reward for 80% of test trials). Uncertainty
in these paradigms is attained by lowering the accuracy of the pre-
diction (e.g., a square that predicts rewards only for 60 or 50%
of test trials). Importantly, in many of these paradigms the unre-
liability of cues remains stable during long blocks of trials (e.g.,
Huettel et al., 2005), which approximates the concept of expected
uncertainty. In contrast, other studies manipulated the volatility
of task rules (e.g., Behrens et al., 2007), in which uncertainty is
achieved by dynamically changing stimulus–response rules across
trials. For instance, if rule A involves reward outcomes for 80% of
squares and rewards for 30% of circles, volatility will be achieved
if this rule frequently alternates with a rule B that would involve
the inverse reward probabilities of rule A. A stable (and thus “cer-
tain”) condition would involve a long sequence of trials in which
only one of the rules is true. Manipulating uncertainty through
volatility of rules approximates Yu and Dayan’s (2005) concept of
unexpected uncertainty, as it introduces fundamental changes in
the environment that invalidate past predictions.
The common feature of these different categories of experimen-
tal manipulations is that they create states that signal the need to
actively regulate our representations of the environment, in order
to obtain better predictions and therefore achieve better adapta-
tion. This regulation can include a suppression and replacement of
current representations, or adjustments of current representations
that reﬂect the level of predictive unreliability of the environment
(Daw et al., 2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005).
COGNITIVE CONTROL
Cognitive control, also often referred to as executive function, usu-
ally denotes a category of processes that are implemented when
automatic schemata are not sufﬁcient for successful adaptation to
the environment. These processes tend to be conscious2, attention-
demanding, and they involve a ﬂexible coordination of several
cognitive processes in order to attain a speciﬁc goal (Atkinson and
Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley, 1986, 2003; Norman and Shallice, 1986;
Baddeley and Della Sala, 1996; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Braver
et al., 2007).
For instance, experienced car drivers utilize a number of over-
trained automatic schemata on a daily basis (e.g., how to negotiate
roundabouts and crossroads, how to operate the gearbox, etc.).
However, if US or continental European drivers have to drive
in a right-hand drive country (e.g., UK or Australia), then these
automatic schemata are no longer adapted and a series of con-
scious, attention-demanding processes have to be implemented
on a sustained basis. The driver will have to actively inhibit previ-
ously learned automatic behaviors and might have to consistently
maintain the new trafﬁc rules that have to be followed in working
memory (WM). This example illustrates a typical implementation
of at least two canonical cognitive control processes: inhibition of
dominant responses and active maintenance of relevant informa-
tion inWM stores (Miyake, 2001; Braver and Ruge, 2006). It is easy
to imagine other cognitive control tasks that these drivers might
have to carry out: dual tasks, controlled encoding, and retrieval
from episodic memory of new driving rules, updating of rules in
WM, etc.
Research on cognitive control has ﬂourished in the last 25 years,
and enormous progress has been attained in characterizing dif-
ferent subprocesses or dimensions of cognitive control (Miyake,
2001; Braver et al., 2007), as well as their neural substrates (e.g.,
Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Braver and Ruge,
2006; Sakai, 2008). The question of what “triggers” cognitive con-
trol implementation, i.e., what determines that a system has to
switch from an automatic toward a controlled processing mode,
has remained for a long time unexplored and relegated to a
“black box” (Baddeley, 2003). However, a relatively recent trend
of research has explored the hypothesis that speciﬁc systems are
devoted to the detection of the “need for control.” Speciﬁcally, a
number of models have suggested the existence of brain systems
devoted to monitoring the need for control and responsible for
sending relevant “trigger” signals to other systems responsible for
implementing control processes (Botvinick et al., 2001; Davis and
Whalen, 2001; Sander et al., 2003; Kerns et al., 2004; Schaefer et al.,
2006;Yeung andCohen, 2006; Schaefer andGray, 2007).A number
of neuroimaging studies have provided clues on the neural net-
work involved in these functions [see below the discussion about
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), orbital frontal cortex (OFC),
and amygdala].
Several hypotheses have been provided regarding the exact con-
textual conditions that would signal the need for control: detection
of errors (Yeung and Cohen, 2006; Braver et al., 2007), changes
in the motivational value (or goal-relevance) of the environment
(Sander et al., 2003; Schaefer et al., 2006; Baddeley, 2007), conﬂict
between competing responses (Botvinick et al., 2001), and changes
in the prediction of error likelihood (Brown and Braver, 2005).
2However, there is an ongoing debate on whether cognitive control is necessarily
conscious (e.g., Sumner and Husain, 2008; Van Gaal et al., 2010, 2011).
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Importantly, the common feature of these hypotheses is a conﬂict
between a current representation used to guide behavior (and
often accessed in an automatic mode) and environmental con-
ditions in which expected outcomes are unlikely to be optimally
achieved.
POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY AND COGNITIVE
CONTROL
From the considerations above, it becomes clear that the constructs
of uncertainty and cognitive control have at least two fundamental
points of intersection:
(1) The deﬁnition of uncertainty has a remarkable similarity with
the conditions usually thought to signal the need for control.
In both cases, there is a mismatch between available schemata
and the actual environment that leads to suboptimal outcomes
(errors, conﬂict between responses, cognitive cost etc.).
(2) Thismismatch is a signal that demands the implementation of
processes that will actively adjust the representations guiding
behavior so that a more efﬁcient adaptation can be achieved.
Despite these similarities, it may be the case that humans do not
need cognitive control to resolve uncertainty. It is entirely conceiv-
able that implicit statistical learning could be sufﬁcient to achieve a
successful adaptation to many forms of uncertainty. We will here-
after review available research that can potentially provide clues
regarding the possibility that cognitive control is recruited during
uncertain decision-making.
FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF UNCERTAINTY: EVIDENCE
OF OVERLAPPING PATTERNS OF BRAIN ACTIVITY BETWEEN
DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND COGNITIVE
CONTROL TASKS
Neuroimaging studies using mainly functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) have provided one of the most proliﬁc
bodies of scientiﬁc research on uncertainty in recent years. Avail-
able evidence suggests that a distributed network of brain areas
is systematically involved in tasks manipulating uncertainty. Next,
we examine some of the key components of this network and its
overlap with the network of brain areas known to be associated to
cognitive control tasks.
DORSOLATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX
Traditionally, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is
thought to play a crucial role in WM and in the active main-
tenance of current task goals (Goldman-Rakic, 1995). Extensive
neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence shows that the
DLPFC is strongly implicated in cognitive control tasks. For
instance, it is involved in the retention of information during
WM tasks and may store active representations that are nec-
essary for adaptive decision-making performance (see Curtis
and D’Esposito, 2003).The DLPFC has also been implicated in
response selection in the presence of interfering or conﬂicting
information (Rowe et al., 2000; Botvinick et al., 2001; Hadland
et al., 2001; Schumacher and D’Esposito, 2002; Schumacher et al.,
2003), control adjustments (Durston et al., 2003), the formulation
and execution of plans of action (Fuster et al., 2000), top-down
attentional control (Milhamet al., 2003),and inmaintaining atten-
tional demands of the task (MacDonald et al., 2000). In addition,
the DLPFC is also involved in task switching (Hyaﬁl et al., 2009;
Savine and Braver, 2010). Overall, several studies and models sug-
gest that the DLPFC is involved in the implementation of control
processes in order to resolve conﬂict, in contrast with other areas
thought to be involved in the detection of conﬂict (Carter andVan
Veen, 2007). This interpretation would be consistent with the fact
that the DLPFC has preferential connections with motor system
structures which may be central to how the PFC exerts control
over behavior (Miller and Cohen, 2001). A wealth of additional
studies have explored the links between the DLPFC and cognitive
control, and reviewing them would be beyond the scope of this
article. We refer the readers to authoritative reviews on this topic
for more details (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Braver and Ruge, 2006;
Carter and Van Veen, 2007; Mansouri et al., 2009).
Recent research suggests that the DLPFC may also play an
important role in decision-making under uncertainty. Particularly,
Huettel et al. (2005) found increased hemodynamic activity in the
DLPFC during decision-making under uncertainty. The authors
presented participants with eight different types of stimuli (vary-
ing amounts of triangles and circles). Participants were asked to
make high or low conﬁdence judgments about the likelihoodof the
feedback stimulus being the same as their selection. If the stimuli
included all triangles or all circles, the chance of feedback stimuli
having the same shape would be 80%, thus the uncertainty would
be low at 20%. These authors varied the proportion of shapes pre-
sented as stimuli so that selections could be made in 20, 27.5, 35,
42.5, or 50% uncertainty. As uncertainty increased, so did activa-
tion in the DLPFC; which they suggest reﬂects the DLPFC’s role
in uncertainty resolution in the form of short-term modiﬁcation
of stimulus–response contingencies, a process that might rely on
high level cognitive control processes (Huettel et al., 2005). These
representations of stimulus–response contingencies are thought to
guide our everyday decisions through underlying rules in which
we learn that a speciﬁc association between a stimulus (S) and a
response (R) is linked with a positive or negative outcome (O)
(De Wit and Dickinson, 2009). Interestingly, evidence from prob-
abilistic learning tasks such as the weather prediction task (Gluck
and Bower, 1988; Gluck et al., 2002) suggests that the involve-
ment of the DLPFC in probabilistic learning might reﬂect implicit,
non-declarative processes rather than conscious control processes
(Poldrack et al., 1999; Weickert et al., 2002). However, recent evi-
dence indicates that the DLPFC is not necessary to non-declarative
learning in these tasks (Rushby et al., 2011).
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest a role for the DLPFC in mod-
ifying S–R–O contingencies to enable adaptive decision-making
in the face of uncertainty and that activation in the DLPFC is
dependent on predictability of S–R–O contingencies (Paulus et al.,
2002).Therefore, predictability and thus certainty, may be repre-
sented in the DLPFC through maintaining representations of the
reinforcement history (previously encountered S–R–O rules) to
select an “optimal strategy” (Paulus et al., 2002). It could therefore
be speculated that the DLPFC is involved in the active mainte-
nance and manipulation in WM of a history of past contingencies
in order to facilitate the prediction of future outcomes. Never-
theless, there is some inconsistency across studies with evidence
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indicating that the DLPFC activation increases as decision stimuli
become more unexpected (Huettel et al., 2002) and others that
suggest that the DLPFC is more active during low error rates, i.e.,
greater predictability (Paulus et al., 2002).
POSTERIOR PARIETAL CORTEX
Parietal areas and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in particular
have often been associated to cognitive control tasks (Braver and
Ruge, 2006). The PPC has been implicated in an array of cognitive
control processes including task switching (Sohn et al., 2000) and
movement planning (Snyder et al., 1997). The PPC is also thought
to be important for sensory–motor integration that might encode
movement intentions (Andersen and Buneo, 2002). Indeed, neu-
rons within the PPC of non-human primates provide codes for
decision variables such as probability and expected value when
making a decision between potential movement intentions (Platt
and Glimcher, 1999).
Along with the DLPFC,Huettel et al. (2005) also found that the
resolution of uncertainty was linked with the PPC. These authors
suggest that the PPC may also be involved in short-term response
selection processes such as modiﬁcation of S–R–O contingencies
during uncertainty. More long term resolution of uncertainty may
rely on S–R–O contingency development, i.e., learning adaptive S–
R–O rules which might be mediated by areas of the medial frontal
cortex (Huettel et al., 2005). Indeed, Volz et al. (2003, 2004) also
demonstrated medial frontal cortex and PPC activation increases
with increasing uncertainty. In their study, Volz et al. (2003)
showed participants pairs of pictures showing comic ﬁgures which
were systematically associated with a particular reward probabil-
ity (either 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, or 1.0), and these associations were
consistent throughout the experiment. As uncertainty increased,
posterior parietal areas known to underlie WM functions also
increased. It has been suggested that this type of result could reﬂect
the role of the PPC in actively maintaining in WM all S–R–O rules
that are valid in an experiment (Bunge et al., 2002).
ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX
The Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) is one of the most promi-
nent neural substrates identiﬁed in cognitive control processing
(seeBotvinick et al., 2001;Braver andRuge,2006). For instance, the
ACChas been found to be involved inmany classical cognitive con-
trol tasks such as the Stroop task (Pardo et al., 1990), the Flanker
task (Botvinick et al., 1999), N-back task (Harvey et al., 2005),
and stop-signal tasks (Brown and Braver, 2005), amongst others.
Evidence also suggests that the ACC is involved in monitoring
cognitive conﬂicts (MacDonald et al., 2000; Botvinick et al., 2001)
and error detection (Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2003). Certain
electrophysiological components known to be linked to cogni-
tive control (and to conﬂict monitoring in particular) are thought
to be generated by ACC sources. For instance, the N2 and the
Error-related negativity (ERN/Ne) event-related brain potentials
(ERP) components are thought to originate in the ACC (Dehaene
et al., 1994; Dikman and Allen, 2000; Gehring and Knight, 2000;
Debener et al., 2005) and are likely to reﬂect the cognitive demands
of situations involving a high level of conﬂict between compet-
ing responses (Yeung and Nieuwenhuis, 2009). Importantly, the
ACC is widely thought to be part of a network of brain structures
specialized in the detection of environmental conditions signal-
ing the need for the implementation of cognitive control, and
responsible for sending “triggers” to other systems specialized in
the actual implementation of control (Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns
et al., 2004; Brown and Braver, 2005).
Activity in the ACC has also been demonstrated to correlate
with levels of uncertainty (Stern et al., 2010). In their task, Stern
et al. (2010) showed participants four sequential draws of cards
taken from two decks. Deck A which contained 80% red cards and
20% blue cards and Deck B which contained 20% red cards and
80% blue cards. Participants had to identify the deck from which
the cards had been drawn. Uncertainty was manipulated by the
frequency of cards presented with the same color in the sequence
of four cards presented to the participants. For instance, four blue
cards was the highest certainty condition, whereas a combination
of two red and two blue cards was associated to maximum uncer-
tainty. The authors found that increased uncertainty was associ-
ated with increases in ACC activity. According to the authors, the
ACC was speciﬁcally involved in“evidence accumulation”whereas
the OFC was involved in the execution of the decision following
the four sequential draws of cards (Stern et al., 2010). Increased
activity in the ACC has also been found to be related to out-
come uncertainty and uncertainty-related physiological arousal
(Critchley et al., 2001). In their study, Critchley et al. (2001) gave
participants a two choice decision-making task, in which a cue (a
card) was predictive of the value of a “feedback card.” Participants
had to decide from the initial card if the feedback card would be
higher or lower than the initial card. Uncertainty was manipulated
by the degree to which the initial card was a reliable predictor
of the feedback card. The participants then experienced a delay
period before the outcome (gain/loss) was presented. Critchley
et al. (2001) found that the ACC was modulated by both outcome
uncertainty and anticipatory delay. In addition, the authors found
a distinct region of the ACC that was commonly modulated by
both uncertainty and physiological arousal.
The ACC has also been associated with hypothesis testing in
uncertain contexts (Elliott and Dolan, 1998). Speciﬁcally, Elliott
and Dolan (1998) presented participants with a series of pairs of
checkerboards with different spatial conﬁgurations of black and
white squares in which participants were asked to try to work out a
rule governing which of each pair was correct (feedback was set at
an uncertain 50% correct level). The task requirement was to gen-
erate a hypothesis (i.e., top left-hand corner ﬁlled) and then test
and update it based on information about which checkerboard
was correct. Hypothesis testing and making a choice was associ-
ated with different foci within the anterior cingulate. Whilst the
dorsal ACC was involved in complex hypothesis testing, the ven-
tral ACC was associated with implementing a choice. This suggests
different roles of the ACC in purely cognitive aspects of process-
ing (hypothesis testing) and evaluative processes related to the
emotional consequences of a choice (Elliott and Dolan, 1998.)
Indeed, the ventral regionof theACC is interconnectedwith limbic
regions such as the amygdala which is widely thought to underlie
emotional processes (Bracht et al., 2009).
Finally, the ACC has also been linked to volatility, i.e., uncer-
tainty created by frequent changes in S–R–O contingencies
(Behrens et al., 2007). In Behrens et al.’s (2007) study, subjects
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carried out a one-armed bandit task in which they had to choose
between blue and green stimuli. Subjects underwent trials where
the probability of a blue outcome was 75% (a certain/stable envi-
ronment) and trials where reward probabilities switched between
80%blue and 80%green every 30 or 40 trials (anuncertain/volatile
environment). Behrens et al.’s (2007) results suggest that ACC
activity might reﬂect a Bayesian estimate of the environment’s
volatility during a monitoring stage, i.e., when outcomes are being
evaluated in order to regulate current beliefs about the underlying
stimulus–response contingencies of the environment. The model
of Behrens et al. (2007) also suggests that the ACC might encode
how much inﬂuence feedback should give to subsequent deci-
sions, with more recent outcomes being more salient in uncertain
contexts (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008).
The available ﬁndings about the involvement of the ACC in
decision-making under uncertainty and in cognitive control tasks
provide an interesting parallel. On the one hand, studies and mod-
els from the realm of cognitive control research suggest that the
ACC might be involved in the detection of the contextual con-
ditions signaling the need for control. On the other hand, data
from the ﬁeld of decision-making processes suggest that the ACC
might be involved in the computation of the level of uncertainty
of current SRO representations (Behrens et al., 2007). An integra-
tion of these ﬁndings could tentatively suggest that both traditions
of research are tapping overlapping processes, in the sense that
uncertainty could be easily seen as a condition signaling the need
for control. However, results from the ﬁeld of decision-making
under uncertainty (and in particular the study from Behrens et al.,
2007) might be providing a more formal description of the com-
putational nature of one of the potential mechanisms that can
trigger the implementation of cognitive control. Nevertheless, at
this stage, these considerations remain hypothetical, as there is
to our knowledge no evidence that clearly demonstrates that the
estimation of uncertainty, as described by Behrens et al. (2007),
necessarily lead to the implementation of cognitive control, or that
the adaptation to uncertainty in these studies relied on processes
other than implicit learning.
ORBITO-FRONTAL CORTEX
The Orbito-Frontal Cortex (OFC) has classically been linked to
the perception of reward and punishment feedback, including
anticipation and receipt of feedback, and is usually thought to be
involved in the representation of stimulus–reward relationships
(Rolls, 1996; O’Doherty et al., 2003). The OFC has also become a
brain area of interest for cognitive control when it was discovered
that this region not only detects valenced outcomes but it also
probably uses this information to bias future behavioral choices
(O’Doherty et al., 2001, 2003). Therefore, it has been suggested
that the OFC might also be involved in processing environmental
conditions signaling the need for behavioral control (O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Braver and Ruge, 2006).
More recently, the OFC has also been shown to differentiate
between different levels of uncertainty (Hsu et al., 2005). In this
study,Hsu et al. (2005) manipulated uncertainty by creating situa-
tions in which participants had to make choices under ambiguity.
For instance, one of the conditions included placing a bet on the
color of a card (e.g., blue or red) to be drawn from a deck without
knowing the actual proportions of blue and red cards of the deck.
In control conditions, relevant information was available prior to
the choice (i.e., participants were told the exact proportions of red
and blue cards in the deck). They found that the level of uncer-
tainty correlated with activation of the OFC and the amygdala.
These authors suggest that a network involving the OFC and the
amygdala would reﬂect the operations of a “vigilance”/evaluation
systemdedicated to evaluate uncertainty and bias behavioral adap-
tation as a function of uncertainty levels. They further support
this idea through a behavioral study on patients with OFC lesions,
ﬁnding that OFC lesions impair the ability to distinguish between
degrees of uncertainty (Hsu et al., 2005).
Related results suggest that theOFC enables acquisition of S–R–
O contingencies, whereby patients with OFC lesions show deﬁcits
in shifting behavior when the underlying S–R–O rule is volatile
(Rolls, 2000). This is consistent with data showing that OFC acti-
vation is associated with hypothesis generation of S–R–O rules
(Goel and Dolan, 2000) and the detection of change in reward
contingencies (O’Doherty et al., 2003). In addition, a number
of other studies have also shown that brain activity in the OFC
increases with increasing outcome uncertainty (Critchley et al.,
2001) and reward uncertainty (Tobler et al., 2006). Finally, activity
in the OFC also increases as the probabilistic stimulus–response
contingencies becomemore complex, suggesting that theOFCmay
reﬂect additional requirements of dealing with uncertainty (Elliott
et al., 1999). However, Stern et al. (2010) suggest that activation
of the OFC by uncertainty is absent when there is no risk, sug-
gesting that the OFC does not detect cognitive uncertainty per se,
but instead responds to uncertainty only when there are incentive
consequences.
In summary, available research clearly shows that the OFC is
sensitive to several types of manipulation of uncertainty. It is
unclear at this stage as to what speciﬁc role the OFC plays in
the processing of uncertainty. However, research in the ﬁeld of
cognitive control would indicate that the OFC might be involved
in tracking valenced information signaling the need for behav-
ioral control. It could therefore be speculated that the OFC detects
several forms of outcome uncertainty because it equates them
to motivationally relevant contextual cues reﬂecting the need for
control.
AMYGDALA
The amygdala is widely known to be associated to a series of emo-
tional processes, and it has been famously associated to fear and
anxiety (LeDoux, 1996), although it is now known that the amyg-
dala is also involved in awider array of affective processes including
positive affect (Zald, 2003). A recent research trend has also found
evidence that the amygdala plays an important role in cogni-
tive control. For instance, Schaefer et al. (2006) have shown that
increases in amygdala activity signiﬁcantly predicted an improve-
ment of performance in a canonical executive task, the N-back
WM task, across two different experiments. More recent studies
have found similar evidence of a relationship between the amyg-
dala and cognitive control processes (Nishijo et al., 2008; Ousdal
et al., 2008;Yun et al., 2010;Chiew andBraver, 2011),which adds to
earlier evidence in both human and animal research (for a review,
see Schaefer and Gray, 2007). A common theory to account for
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the role of the amygdala in cognitive control posits that the amyg-
dala is responsible for evaluating changes in themotivational value
(or goal-relevance) of the environment, and when these changes
exceed a certain threshold, biasing signals are sent to cognitive and
motor systems in order to facilitate adaptation (Davis andWhalen,
2001; Sander et al., 2003; Schaefer et al., 2006; Schaefer and Gray,
2007). It is thought that this mechanism can be involved in the
implementation of cognitive control, but also in the generation of
emotional responses (Schaefer et al., 2006).
As indicated by the ﬁndings of Hsu et al. (2005) described
above, the amygdala also appears to be linked to the evaluation
of contextual uncertainty. Similar conclusions have been reached
in animal studies (for a review, see Rosen and Donley, 2006). In
particular, Rosen and Donley (2006) suggest that the amygdala
may be particularly linked to uncertain situations characterized
by unexpected changes in the environment, which would relate to
the concept of unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005), and
to the construct of rule volatility (Behrens et al., 2007). The amyg-
dala is also activated under internally driven uncertainty, i.e., self
reported levels of uncertainty (Zaretsky et al., 2010), which sug-
gests that the amygdala is activated when sufﬁcient data regarding
a potential threat in the surroundings is lacking (Whalen et al.,
1998; Zaretsky et al., 2010). For instance, Zaretsky et al. (2010)
asked participants to report their perceived certainty regarding
the level of danger associated to ambiguous face stimuli. They
found that amygdala activity increases were associated with an
increase in perceived uncertainty. Consistent with this idea, Davis
and Whalen (2001) have suggested a model in which the amyg-
dala is responsible for increasing levels of vigilance in response
to uncertain stimuli or situations. This increase in vigilance lev-
els would bias a series of control systems which would in turn
facilitate general adaptation to the initial uncertain context.
The similarities between models of the role of the amygdala in
uncertainty and models of the role of the amygdala in cognitive
control are obvious. In both cases, fundamental changes in the
goal-relevance of a situation are thought to trigger a response that
signals the need to implement a controlled adaptive response. This
mechanism shares similarities with the role often attributed to the
ACC in cognitive control and reinforces the thesis that uncertainty
plays a signiﬁcant potential role in“triggering”the implementation
of cognitive control.
UNCERTAINTY AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
Whilst many of the aforementioned studies have shown overlaps
between regions implicated in uncertainty processing and cogni-
tive control, a recent study by Bhanji et al. (2010) attempted to
investigate the dissociations between these two processes. In this
study, the researchersmanipulated taskdifﬁculty,assumed to index
the recruitment of cognitive control resources and choice certainty.
For each trial, participants were presented with a cue (containing
numbers) and had to predict whether a feedback screen would
include a number higher or lower than the cue. Outcomes ranged
from small ($0.2) to large ($1) gains or losses for correct and incor-
rect answers respectively. In “Gambling” blocks, participants had
to “guess” the value of the feedback. Uncertainty was manipulated
through biasing the probabilities of positive/negative outcomes
linked to speciﬁc number cues. Low choice certainty included
cues of 2, 3, 8, and 9 whilst high certainty included cues 4, 5,
6, and 7. In “Rule” blocks, participants had to estimate the value
of the feedback following previously learned rules that could be
simple or complex. The authors found that the amygdala and the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex were less active in choice uncer-
tainty compared to choice certainty, and the insula was more
involved in uncertainty compared to certainty. Next, the authors
also found that the lateral PFC and ACC areas were related to
rule complexity. While this study is a worthwhile attempt to dif-
ferentiate uncertainty from processes related to cognitive control,
some of its results can be explained by an alternative account. For
instance, in this study, choice certaintywas intrinsically linkedwith
a higher frequency of trial-to-trial positive outcomes (monetary
gains). Therefore, the involvement of the amygdala and VMPFC
in choice certainty could well be the result of an anticipation of
reward, as acknowledged by the authors.
In summary, available evidence from functional neuroimaging
shows a strong overlap between the neural networks of uncertainty
processing and cognitive control. Speciﬁcally, uncertain contexts
appear to activate a typical “cognitive control network” including
lateral PFC areas, parietal areas and the ACC. In addition, uncer-
tainty is also linked to brain systems thought to be responsible
for monitoring the need to implement top-down control (ACC
and amygdala). A tentative explanation could posit that differ-
ent forms of uncertainty share common features that monitoring
systems (probably linked to the ACC and the amygdala) are pro-
grammed to detect and interpret as signals that top-down control
needs to be implemented. Next, biasing signals could be sent to
other systemsmore directly linked to the actual implementation of
cognitive control processes (e.g.,WM, inhibition, etc.). This expla-
nation would be compatible with existing models of the dynamics
of cognitive control and monitoring processes (Botvinick et al.,
2001; Yeung and Cohen, 2006), as well as with current models of
amygdala function (Davis and Whalen, 2001; Sander et al., 2003;
Schaefer et al., 2006; Ousdal et al., 2008). In the next section, we
discuss in more detail the potential links between uncertainty and
monitoring processes.
UNCERTAINTY AND MONITORING
As suggested in the previous sections, uncertainty might play a role
in a key component of cognitive control – monitoring processes.
Monitoring usually refers to a set of processes that evaluate the
need to implement or adjust top-down control, and this process
is often deﬁned within the scope of the speciﬁc monitoring of
the outcomes of ongoing behavior (Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns
et al., 2004; Yeung and Cohen, 2006; Brown, 2009). In this section
we review evidence supporting the idea of a relationship between
decision-making under uncertainty and monitoring processes.
First, relevant evidence can be found in the ﬁeld of complex
dynamic control (CDC) tasks. CDC tasks are complex tasks often
enacting realistic scenarioswith frequent applications in ergonom-
ics and human factors (e.g., ﬂight and driving simulators, virtual
markets, virtual problem solving such as forest ﬁre-ﬁght scenar-
ios, etc.). Evidence from CDC tasks suggests that uncertainty is
associated to an increase in the frequency of monitoring behav-
iors and in the amount of attention allocated to the monitoring
of decision outcomes (Osman, 2010). For instance, Mosier et al.
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(2007) investigated the performance of airline pilots in a con-
trolled ﬂight simulator context. Several scenarios were used which
required monitoring (visual search of decision feedback informa-
tion in control panels) and control and execution (diagnosis and
decision) processes.Whenparticipantswere presentedwith incon-
gruent or conﬂicting information, presented in an unpredictable
manner (e.g., system failures), diagnosis took signiﬁcantly longer,
and pilots spentmore time inmonitoring behaviors thanwhen sit-
uations and information were stable and information congruent.
Similarly, Metzger and Parasuraman (2005) examined the effects
of an automated systemon performance of air trafﬁc controllers in
monitoring free-maneuvering aircraft across two contexts. In one
context, participants were provided with a 100% reliable auto-
mated system to aid them in a conﬂict detection task and in the
second they were provided an imperfect monitoring aid in which
the reliability of the automated system was uncertain. Metzger and
Parasuraman (2005) observed that under the uncertain system,
trafﬁc controllers had a greater likelihood of detecting conﬂicts,
which can indicate that greater attentional resourceswere allocated
to conﬂict monitoring when the context was uncertain. Consistent
with this interpretation, Diez et al. (2001) measured eye tracking
data from pilots during their interaction with a Boeing 747 ﬂight
simulator, and in particular during monitoring of decision out-
comes (through events in the control panel). A distinction was
made between information related to stable vs. uncertain aspects
of the ﬂight (for instance, altitude, position and speed are vari-
able and uncertain). Results showed that eye ﬁxations were longer
for indicators of uncertain ﬂight-related information compared to
stable information. In addition, subsequent recall was higher for
uncertain in comparison to stable information.
However, theremight be an upper limit to the amount of uncer-
tainty that can be handled by outcome monitoring (Xie and Guo,
2000). Sarter et al. (2007) measured behavioral and eye track-
ing data from pilots on a 1-h ﬂight simulation under extremely
challenging events, where participants experienced expected and
unexpected changes in automation modes. In these highly uncer-
tain environments, participant’s ﬁxation rates on unexpected
changes were low and completely failed to monitor these changes
43% of the time in comparison to a failure rate of 29% in
expected automation changes. This uncertainty monitoring bias
often comes with a cost, as increasing amounts of uncertainty
make it difﬁcult to effectively process relevant feedback (Atkins
et al., 2002; Patrick and James, 2004; Bredereke and Lankenau,
2005; Gao and Lee, 2006; Mosier et al., 2007).
Second, evidence of a relationship between uncertainty and
monitoring processes is also provided by research using Event-
related potentials (ERPs). Outcome monitoring processes are
investigated in this ﬁeld mainly through two brain potentials: the
ERN and the feedback-related negativity (FRN; Falkenstein et al.,
2000; Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2006; Sailer et al.,
2010).
The ERN is an early frontocentral negativity time-locked to an
incorrect response (Gehring et al., 1990; Falkenstein et al., 1991)
and is believed to be generated in the ACC (Dehaene et al., 1994;
Dikman and Allen, 2000; Gehring and Knight, 2000). Competing
theories postulate that the ERN reﬂects the activity of a generic
error detection (Dehaene et al., 1994) or a response conﬂict system
(Carter et al., 1998). Whilst errors are thought to be processed
differently to correct responses (Gehring and Knight, 2000), it has
been suggested that uncertainty may cause errors to go undetected
because of misrepresentation of the correct response (Pailing and
Segalowitz, 2004) and thus may reduce the amplitude of the ERN
(Falkenstein et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2001). In a study by Scheffers
and Coles (2000), participants completed a two choice reaction
time task under degraded stimulus conditions, designed to induce
stimulus uncertainty. After response to each trial, participants
were asked to rate their perceived accuracy on the trial. Results
showed that errors due to premature responses (where errors were
accurately identiﬁed as errors immediately after the response) had
large ERN amplitudes; however, errors caused by stimulus uncer-
tainty (errors where there was uncertainty about the error) had a
reduction in ERN amplitude. Similar conclusions were reached by
Pailing and Segalowitz (2004), who used letter and tone discrimi-
nation tasks in which uncertainty was manipulated by varying the
amount of information provided by pre-stimulus cues. Results
showed a signiﬁcant decrease in the ERN amplitude for uncertain
conditions. Importantly, this effect was enhanced in conditions in
which attention was depleted by a concurrent task. These results
suggest that under conditions of increased uncertainty about per-
formance, errors, and correct trials are more likely to be judged or
perceived in a similar manner.
The FRN is an early negativity time-locked to the delivery
of feedback in decision-making paradigms. The FRN is typi-
cally larger following feedback signaling negative outcomes (e.g.,
“losses”) compared to positive outcomes (“wins”; Miltner et al.,
1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and Coles, 2002;
Holroyd et al., 2003; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005; Hajcak et al., 2006). However, more recent studies have
shown that feedback of positive valence can also elicit FRN (Yeung
and Sanfey, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2005; Müller et al., 2005; Yeung
et al., 2005). It has been suggested that the FRN reﬂects a general
performance monitoring system that is activated by violations in
expectancy (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Oliveira et al., 2007).
The FRN has also been implicated in the processing of outcome
certainty (Hajcak et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2007). For instance,
Cohen et al. (2007) used a probabilistic reinforcement task to
investigate the effect of outcome probabilities on the FRN. In this
study, uncertainty was operationalized through the manipulation
of reward probabilities across blocks in a two choice decision task.
High uncertainty inwin trials (where reward probability was 25%)
resulted in larger and more sustained FRN amplitude, in compar-
ison to more certain (50 and 75% reward probability) positive
outcomes. Similar results on FRN amplitude come from a recent
study by Moser and Simons (2009). Participants performed a two
choice gambling task in which they were asked to predict the out-
come of their choice prior to selection and after selection. Here,
FRN amplitude was highest when participants were uncertain of
the outcome and changed their mind from an initial prediction
of “lose” to post choice prediction of “win” (see also Sailer et al.,
2010 for similar conclusions). In addition, the FRN may also be
related to control processes, with research suggesting that this
component reﬂects the activity of a reinforcement learning sys-
tem which is used to adjust subsequent behavior (Hajcak et al.,
2006; Cohen et al., 2007) and is also linked with attentional mech-
anisms (Moser and Simons, 2009) and WM demands (Suchan
et al., 2005).
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In summary, reviewed evidence from CDC tasks and elec-
trophysiological research suggests strong links between uncer-
tainty and monitoring processes: uncertainty increases the fre-
quency of monitoring behaviors and the amount of attention allo-
cated to outcome monitoring. Next, uncertainty also modulates
brain potentials reﬂecting the processing of decision outcomes:
uncertainty is associated to larger FRNs and reduced ERNs.
INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY
It is widely acknowledged that psychiatric populations exhibit dys-
functional decision-making (Ladouceur et al., 2000). Interestingly,
it is now becoming apparent that psychiatric disorders can also be
linked with deﬁcits in coping with uncertainty. It has been sug-
gested that an inability to cope with uncertainty may even act as a
driving force behind a number of behaviors and cognitions (e.g.,
worry, obsessions, compulsions, hypervigilance) associated with
various anxiety disorders (Holaway et al., 2006). IOU is a construct
deﬁned as“a tendency to react negatively on an emotional, cognitive,
and behavioral level to uncertain situations and events” (Heimberg
et al., 2004, p. 143). IOU has been demonstrated in general anxiety
disorder (GAD; Garber et al., 1980; Andrews and Borkovec, 1988;
Dugas et al., 1998; Covin et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Boelen
and Reijntjes, 2009), obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD; Steke-
tee et al., 1998), Schizophrenia (Broome et al., 2007; Dudley et al.,
2011), and Eating Disorders (Konstantellou and Reynolds, 2010;
Sternheim et al., 2011). Here, we will review the evidence that
demonstrates an important role for IOU in a number of disorders
known to be associated with deﬁcits in cognitive control tasks.
GENERAL ANXIETY DISORDER
General anxiety disorder is a disorder characterized by excessive
and persistent worrying (Dugas et al., 1998) and has been used
to highlight the importance of uncertainty in psychiatric disor-
ders (Paulus, 2007). IOU has been postulated to play a central
role in anxiety (Krohne, 1989). For instance, measures of IOU
can differentiate between clinical and healthy populations in GAD
(Buhr and Dugas, 2002) and can predict changes in anxious symp-
toms (Dugas et al., 2009). Importantly, high worriers show a clear
deﬁcit in decision-making under uncertain situations with longer
reaction times (see Ladouceur et al., 2000) and more informa-
tion seeking behavior (Gibbs-Gallagher et al., 2003). Further, IOU
has been associated with greater recall and threatening interpreta-
tions of ambiguous information (Dugas et al., 2005) and greater
attempts to reduce uncertainty (Ladouceur et al., 2000). Worri-
ers take longer to make category judgments than non-worriers,
particularly when confronted with uncertain (ambiguous) stimuli
(Metzger et al., 1990; Tallis et al., 1991). Raghunathan and Pham
(1999) found that anxious decision makers preferred to choose
high probability rewards linked to low monetary gains instead of
more infrequent but much larger gains. This ﬁnding illustrates the
tendency of anxious individuals to opt for safer and less uncertain
choices, even at a signiﬁcant cost.
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Patients with psychosis, or at risk of psychosis, display a difﬁ-
culty in tolerating uncertainty (e.g., Broome et al., 2007). Strauss
et al. (2011) claim that reduced reward-seeking behavior in Schiz-
ophrenia is critically related to the extent to which patients make
exploratory choices when they are uncertain. “Jumping to con-
clusions” (JTC), a frequent symptom in schizophrenia, has also
been found to be associated with the construct of IOU (Freeman
et al., 2008). Moritz et al. (2011) have suggested the idea that
JTC in schizophrenic patients may contribute to well-being since
quick decision-making decreases doubt and uncertainty. Indeed,
JTC may be more evident in individuals who ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to tolerate ambiguity (Colbert and Peters, 2002). This suggests
a need to reduce uncertainty in schizophrenia, similar to that
seen in other psychopathologies. Interestingly, a similar phenom-
enon is associated to IOU in GAD individuals. High IOU was
indeed associated with faster decision-making in anxious indi-
viduals when subjects were faced with an outcome delay and
thus waiting in a state of uncertainty (Luhmann et al., 2011).
Further, an important theory of uncertainty processing (Yu and
Dayan, 2005), has been linked to delusions and hallucinations
associated with schizophrenia. Speciﬁcally, Patel et al. (2010) have
suggested that hallucinations may be linked to neurotransmit-
ters involved in the interaction between top-down and bottom-
up processing where hallucinations could be experienced due to
over-processing of top-down signals resulting in uncertainty in
information processing.
OBSESSIVE–COMPULSIVE DISORDER
One of the characteristics of OCD is pathological doubt, which is
most clearly evident among patients with checking rituals (Rach-
man and Hodgson, 1980; Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992). Interest-
ingly, uncertainty extends to long term memory of past events,
as OCD individuals tend to be uncertain about their memory for
checked events (Van Den Hout and Kindt, 2004). More directly,
Tolin et al. (2003) found that repeating rituals were associated with
IOU. IOU in OCD patients may reﬂect the belief on the part of
OCD patients that they lack sufﬁcient coping or problem solv-
ing skills to effectively manage threatening situations that have the
potential to evoke discomfort and negative emotionality (Holaway
et al., 2006). Many of the traits associated with OCD can be viewed
as the products of control exerted within the emotional, interper-
sonal, cognitive, and behavioral domains (Gibbs-Gallagher et al.,
2003). Difﬁculty in decision-making in OCD is characterized
by a cautious approach to information categorization, frequent
requests for information repetition, and doubts about the cor-
rectness of decisions (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working
Group, 1997).
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Importantly, patients with these psychopathological disorders not
only show an IOU but also exhibit deﬁcits in classical cogni-
tive control tasks. For instance, OCD patients usually show an
impairedperformance on tests of executive function. Indeed,OCD
patients show performance deﬁcits on measures of response inhi-
bition (Aycicegi et al., 2003). Particularly, OCD subjects exhibit
higher interference costs in the Stroop task (Hartston and Swerd-
low, 1999), making signiﬁcantly more errors and slower reaction
times on the interference trials of the Stroop test (Martinot et al.,
1990; Bannon et al., 2002). It has been suggested thatOCD subjects
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exhibit deﬁcits in behavioral and cognitive inhibition (Enright and
Beech, 1990; Rosenberg et al., 1997), which might underlie the
repetitive symptomatic behaviors of the disorder, such as compul-
sions andobsessions (Bannon et al., 2002).Deﬁcits amongpatients
with OCD may also be associated with co-morbidity with depres-
sive symptoms and schizotypal personality features (Aycicegi et al.,
2003). Schizophrenia is also usually characterized by deﬁcits in
executive function (Liddle andMorris, 1991). For instance, schizo-
phrenic patients performworse inNoGo conditions in aGo/NoGo
tasks suggesting a failure of response inhibition in schizophrenic
patients (Weisbrod et al., 2000). Deﬁcits in cognitive control have
also been observed in patients with high anxiety (Wood et al.,
2001). For instance, these deﬁcits include dysfunctional response
inhibition (Gernsbacher et al., 1990) with more attention paid to
threatening distracters in the Stroop task (Mathews et al., 1990).
High levels of anxiety have also been shown to limit WM capacity
(Eysenck and Calvo, 1992).
NEURAL PROCESSING OF UNCERTAINTY IN PATIENTS WITH AFFECTIVE
DISORDERS
Together, these results imply that disorders such as GAD, OCD,
and Schizophrenia show deﬁcits in both uncertainty processing
and cognitive control. In addition, these abnormalities are cou-
pled with dysfunctional neural processing. Indeed, hyperactivity
of frontal–amygdala limbic regions suggests that greater IOU is
associatedwith an elevated affective response touncertainty (Krain
et al., 2008). Here, we will review neurological evidence for deﬁcits
in neural substrates that are known to underlie cognitive control
and uncertainty processing.
Schizophrenic patients have been shown to activate frontal
areas insufﬁciently (Berman et al., 1992) with patients showing
deﬁcits in response inhibition that are coupled with disruption
of the frontal P300 ERP amplitude, which may also indicate
dysfunction of frontal neuronal circuits (Weisbrod et al., 2000).
Interestingly, a fronto-parietal dysregulation has been observed
in schizophrenic patients where the assessment of uncertainty is
linked to decreased activation of the medial prefrontal cortex and
an increased activation in the parietal cortex (Paulus et al., 2002).
Further, schizophrenic patients show a deﬁcit in reward-related
probabilistic trial-and-error learning (Koch et al., 2010). This
impairment was associated with the inability to reduce processing
resources in association with increasing predictability, suggesting
that patients exhibit a deﬁcit in neural processing in response to
uncertainty. Indeed, patients showed altered activation patterns in
mainly frontal, cingulate, and striatal brain areas; regions known to
be involved in uncertainty processing in healthy volunteers during
feedback- or reward-based probabilistic learning (Fiorillo et al.,
2003; Koch et al., 2008; Schlosser et al., 2009). These regions are
also strongly implicated in decision-making, performance moni-
toring, and cognitive control (Volz et al., 2003; Zysset et al., 2006;
Koch and Preuschoff, 2007; Koch et al., 2008).
General anxiety disorder subjects show increased activation in
the ACC in response to infrequent errors, suggesting the propen-
sity to be more engaged in error-related processing, which might
then increase anticipation of adverse outcomes and contribute to
fearfulness and avoidance of future conﬂict processing (Paulus
et al., 2004). Indeed, hyperactivity in the ACC, which is chieﬂy
involved in both uncertainty and cognitive control (see previous
sections),may be a key feature of anxiety disorders (Paulus, 2007).
Further, dysfunctional ACC activity has been observed during
performance of an emotion-word Stroop task in anxious individ-
uals (Engels et al., 2007) and with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD; Bremner et al., 2004; Etkin and Wager, 2007). Indeed, the
degree of activity in the dorsal (“cognitive”) region of the ACC
has been said to be a predictor of the level of self reported neg-
ative affect across individuals during reappraisal (Ochsner et al.,
2002). These ﬁndings suggest that cognitive control regions play an
important role in reappraisal and controlling emotional responses
(Banich et al., 2009).
In addition, GAD patients high in IOU have shown less acti-
vation in fronto-median areas (Schienle et al., 2010), a region
thought to be involved in uncertainty processing (Volz et al., 2003).
Schienle et al. (2010) have suggested that this ﬁnding might reﬂect
a potential deﬁcit of systems devoted to cognitive coping and
preparatory actions in individuals who suffer from IOU (Schienle
et al., 2010).
Finally, OCD symptoms are said to be caused by abnormali-
ties in fronto-striatal circuitry (Insel, 1992). Particularly, OCD is
thought to be linked to a dysfunction in the circuits connecting
the basal ganglia to the OFC, which would produce a number of
cognitive and motor abnormalities (Wise et al., 1989; Alexander
et al., 1990). The OFC has directly been implicated in patients with
OCD (Rauch et al., 1994, 2002). As discussed previously, the OFC
is known to be involved in certain aspects of cognitive control
and it also appears to be involved in uncertainty processing (Hsu
et al., 2005). It has been proposed that the deﬁcit of OCD patients
in the OFC might reﬂect an altered processing of reward history
and valuation of options due to a relative disconnection between
the dorsolateral, orbitofrontal, and anterior cingulate cortices with
limbic regions (especially the amygdala) and with the basal ganglia
(Holaway et al., 2006).
To date, relatively few studies have directly addressed the link
between IOU and cognitive control in patient populations. How-
ever, a study by Broome et al. (2007) attempted to link IOU with
deﬁcits in cognitive control in individual at high risk of developing
psychosis. In this study, patients were shown two jars of colored
beads, informed of the relative proportions of beads in each and
then told that they would be shown a series of beads drawn from
one of the jars. They are then asked, on the basis of the observed
sequence, to judge which jar is the source of the beads, and to
be “as certain as possible.” The ability to hold information about
bead color online was assessed using an adaptation of the digit
span task that used a string of different colored beads. The authors
found that IOU was negatively correlated with WM performance
(assessed by the colored beads task) and positively correlated with
JTC.
In summary, reviewed evidence indicates that individual dif-
ferences in how we deal with uncertainty are linked to a series of
psychopathological disorders known to be associated with deﬁcits
in cognitive control. Next, IOU seems to be linked to altered pat-
terns of brain activity in systems involved in both uncertainty and
cognitive control (Schienle et al., 2010). Finally, there is evidence
that IOU might also be linked to an impairment in WM, a typical
sub-process of cognitive control (Broome et al., 2007).
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SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
The evidence reviewed in this article shows that available research
provides a wealth of both indirect and direct evidence of potential
and even intrinsic relationships between uncertainty and cogni-
tive control. First, functional neuroimaging studies investigating
uncertainty have uncovered a neural network that has a remark-
able overlap with brain networks usually associated with cognitive
control tasks. In particular, a network involving lateral PFC areas,
parietal cortex, and the ACC seems to be constantly activated for
decision-making tasks in which outcome uncertainty is manip-
ulated and also in a wide range of classical cognitive control
tasks. Importantly, neuroimaging studies of uncertainty have also
unveiled behavioral patterns that are consistent with the recruit-
ment of controlled processes, such as an increase of response time
in uncertain conditions (an effect that had already been shown in
a vast body of behavioral research, see for instance Bertelson and
Boons, 1960).
Second, a number of behavioral and electrophysiological stud-
ies indicates a strong relationship between uncertainty and a key
component of cognitive control – outcome monitoring. In partic-
ular, it appears that highly uncertain environments tend to increase
the recruitment of monitoring processes. In addition, studies on
the ERNandFRNbrain potentials suggests that systems devoted to
processing the valence of decision outcomes are hyper-activated
during uncertainty, and that correct and incorrect decisions are
more difﬁcult to discriminate in such contexts. This pattern of
effects could indicate that uncertainty is a state that triggers an
enhanced activity of systems dedicated to the monitoring of the
outcomes of our actions. A tentative explanation for these effects
could be that when there is a realization that the outcomes of
our decisions are difﬁcult to predict, an enhanced processing of
outcomes might be an adaptive solution. This strategy can poten-
tially facilitate the accurate detection of changes in the underlying
rules in the environment and lead to a more successful adapta-
tion. Interestingly, monitoring processes are often seen as a trigger
for the implementation of cognitive control processes, by pro-
viding a mechanism that evaluates the “need for control” of a
given situation. In this sense, the construct of uncertainty could
be seen as a summary of the contextual conditions that are the
causal antecedents of the implementation of cognitive control,
rather than a set of processes that would be independent from
cognitive control. This explanation would be consistent with the
fact that many of the overlapping activations in neuroimaging
studies from the ﬁeld of cognitive control and the ﬁeld of decision-
making under uncertainty, point toward a network of brain areas
thought to be involved in the detection of contextual cues signal-
ing the need for control (ACC, OFC, and amygdala), and in the
utilization of this information to bias behavior (see the section
on functional neuroimaging). Future studies will be needed to
explicitly examine whether and how manipulating levels of out-
come uncertainty can trigger the implementation of cognitive
control.
Third, although there is evidence that uncertainty is strongly
linked to the monitoring stage of cognitive control, only indirect
published evidence exists of the potential role of cognitive con-
trol in the resolution of uncertainty in post-monitoring stages.
The involvement of lateral PFC areas in conditions of increasing
outcome uncertainty may suggest that systems devoted to the
implementation of cognitive control are used to resolve uncer-
tainty, as reviewed in the neuroimaging section. This idea is also
supported bybehavioral patterns observedduringuncertainty that
are consistent with the recruitment of cognitive control (such as
increased RT during high uncertainty). Overall, the data and mod-
els reviewed in this article suggest a two-way transaction between
outcome uncertainty and cognitive control: outcome uncertainty
can be seen as a state that triggers the implementation of cognitive
control and in turn one of the main functions of cognitive control
processes would be to facilitate learning about uncertain S–R–O
mappings. It is important to stress that this possibility does not
rule out that implicit learning processes also play a role in the adap-
tation to uncertain environments. Further research will be needed
to investigate the extent to which cognitive control contributes to
the resolution of uncertainty above and beyond implicit learning
processes. For instance, future research should focus on paradigms
in which uncertain decision-making is combined with concurrent
tasks tapping cognitive control (e.g., Bhanji et al., 2010, provide an
example of such paradigms).
Fourth, an emerging literature in psychopathology indicates
that individual differences in IOU are linked to a series of affec-
tive disorders known to be associated with deﬁcits in cognitive
control, such as OCD and GAD. In addition, some evidence
(Broome et al., 2007) indicates that IOU is also correlated with
lower performance in cognitive control tasks. This body of evi-
dence tentatively suggests that a number of affective disorders
may be characterized by an inability to adapt to uncertainty,
and that this deﬁcit might be linked to lower efﬁciency in cog-
nitive control function. However, further research will be needed
to characterize more precisely the potential causal links between
uncertainty, cognitive control and affective disorders. In addition,
an interesting potential area of development in the ﬁeld of IOU
could be the development of cognitive training techniques targeted
at decision-making under uncertainty. Cognitive and attentional
training techniques seem to be providing promising results in clin-
ical populations (See et al., 2009). Testing training schedules for
clinical populations aimed at using cognitive control in order to
cope more effectively with uncertainty might inform us about
the potential causal links between IOU, uncertainty and cognitive
control.
Finally, it has to be noted that the fundamental distinc-
tion between expected and unexpected uncertainty does not
appear to have led to systematic differences in brain activity.
Paradigms tapping these two concepts (e.g., volatility studies
for unexpected uncertainty and reward probability manipula-
tions/ambiguity studies for expected uncertainty) have been asso-
ciated to approximately similar brain networks in functional
imaging studies. Future research will be necessary to reﬁne the
techniques used to investigate the neural correlates of these two
types of uncertainty, and also to specify further the taxonomy of
different forms of uncertainty.
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